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Primate conservation is often complicated by the presence of human 
communities competing for shared resources. Considering the finite nature of 
these resources, this cohabitation can lead to a dilemma wherein a particular 
community (either non-human primate or human) grows to the detriment of 
the other. Immediately, this dilemma may be addressed from either an 
anthropocentric or a non-anthropocentric perspective. The former demands we 
prioritize our own kind, forgoing non-human primate conservation unless it is 
also able to benefit human communities. Alternatively, primate conservation 
can be approached non-anthropocentrically through initiatives that seek to 
extend basic human rights to the great ape family. Such “live-and-let-live” 
programs are difficult to enforce and often face scrutiny and scepticism by 
nearby human communities. While including local communities as agents of 
conservation may appear to solve the dilemma, such approaches are derived 
from a cost-benefit system where conservation agendas are upheld only as long 
as they benefit the local people executing them. This prioritization is potentially 
solvable by a deeper ecological understanding of both human and non-human 
primates and their reciprocal relationship. Such a profound change, however, 
will require long-term, sustained effort and fails to improve primate 
conservation adequately in the short term. Thus, primate conservation will 
continue to balance and reconcile the needs of both human and primate 
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Approximately half of the world's primates are endangered (Riley, 2010, p. 235), a 
statistic we have become accustomed to hearing on sensationalized television specials. 
The irony of the primates' situation is in the advertisements interrupting these 
documentaries that showcase starving orphans and impoverished villages. The 
nonhuman primate also struggles: lacking water, arable land, and the economic means to 
survive, nearby human populations are also at risk. Both populations make their homes 
on the same land and require many of the same resources. Additionally, each of the 
cohabiting populations often develops to the detriment of the other (Treves et al, 2006, 
p. 383). Given the finite ecological space and resources, there is competition between the 
two for domination of an area, and our resources to aid either population are inherently 
limited. Thus, a decision to help one population is often a decision to indirectly harm the 
other. The limits in our, and the environment's, resources create a moral dilemma when 
it comes to the conservation of primates and nearby humans: which group is to receive 
priority? 
There are two opposing camps in primate conservation. The first implores that we 
prioritize our own kind; this anthropocentric view dictates that until humans can 
successfully manage their own communities, resources should focus fully on that cause 
(Hill, 2002, p.1148; Lovett & Marshall, 2006, p. 114). Such a human-centric perspective 
can be justified through an evolutionary framework.  
The Darwinian understanding of ecology dictates that an action is best if it increases 
the reproductive potential of an individual. Failing this, the next best strategy is one that 
benefits that individual's group, population, or species (Strier, 2011, pp. 96-97). Nowhere 
in the ecological struggle for survival is there a rule about defending a foreign species 
unless such an action would directly benefit the decision-making individual. Given that 
primate conservation often compromises surrounding human communities by limiting 
their resources (Treves et al, 2006, p. 383), it is unrealistic to expect nearby human 
populations to defend primates. Likewise, it is ecologically unsound to focus our aid on 
protecting primate livelihoods when members of our own species struggle.  
By focusing aid efforts on humans and prioritizing human livelihoods over 
conservation goals, anthropocentric ethics on primate conservation indirectly advocate 
that primate livelihoods are less important than our own. This perspective holds that 
until we are able to manage our own communities, available resources should be 
allocated to this cause. Efforts to conserve primates would only be made under this 
framework if preserving the primates could benefit humans, either directly or indirectly 
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One anthropocentric justification for the conservation of primates is biophilia, the 
human love for and fascination with living beings. Human biophilia is an innate quality 
that is stronger for creatures that bear a resemblance to us. Being humanoid in 
appearance and our closest living relatives genetically, primates become instant 
“bestsellers” in this regard, (Rose, 2011, pp. 247-248). Anthropocentric discourse on 
conservation focuses on biophilia and the similarities between humans and primates. For 
example, parallels can be drawn between human and primate hands, concluding that 
primates are as we are and thus deserve our protection.  
In contrast, the issue of primate conservation can be approached from a non-
anthropocentric, ecological point of view. This view does not prioritize humans, but 
neither does it prioritize primates. In essence, these ethics assign equal rights to both 
populations as individuals; attempting to draw attention to the status of primates as 
beings with equal moral rights stands as a goal in and of itself (Lovett & Marshall, 2006, 
p. 114). Several associations (the Great Ape Project being perhaps the most notable) 
focus their conservation efforts in assigning human rights—and not just animal rights—
to nonhuman primates and, more specifically, great apes (greatapeproject.org, 2012, 
paras. 1-2). While the extent of rights assigned to animal rights are contested, basic 
human rights are firmly established and acknowledged by governments and other 
institutions. Further, assigning them animal rights reinforces the divide between humans 
and great apes, necessitating the very ranking systems and need for priorities that 
grouping them together would avoid. If instead we deem humans and great apes as 
fitting under the same category of rights, we are levelling the amount each is weighed 
when discussing conservation or other forms of assistance. Lastly, these legal rights 
would protect great apes from human exploitation and make human encroachment and 
habitat destruction prosecutable (greatapeproject.org, N.D. ¶3). Indirectly, assigning 
nonhuman primates equal moral rights defends their ability to live in their natural 
habitats, undisturbed by humans.  
The Great Ape Project and other non-anthropocentric initiatives advocate a “live-
and-let-live” principle. Non-interference philosophies can be upheld by conservation 
initiatives that protect specific areas of land from human influence. Unfortunately, these 
initiatives are wholly dependent on compliance with park boundaries and regulations. 
While they create laws and legislation that give nonhuman primates rights to exist and 
flourish safely, these initiatives are only as strong as the legal system in the area. 
Especially in critical areas where human livelihood suffers and locals may not understand 
conservationist agendas, patrolling parks and enforcing bans on destructive behaviours 
can be nearly impossible to implement effectively (Hill, 2002, p.1188; Treves et al, 2006, 
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Because of these difficulties in maintaining non-anthropocentric initiatives, the 
trend in conservation is shifting towards initiatives that include local communities as 
agents. These initiatives are reminiscent of anthropocentric ones in that they focus on 
local communities. However, unlike anthropocentric agendas (for which the result is a 
healthy human community to the detriment of primate populations), these efforts use 
the well-being of primate populations to create healthy human communities. The most 
obvious method of doing this is by offering local communities livelihood incentives for 
conserving local primates and protecting their habitats (Hill, 2002 p. 1188; Lovett & 
Marshall, 2006, p. 114). By offering incentives to local communities, conservation efforts 
stand to benefit both populations and seemingly solve the ethical dilemma of prioritizing 
one over the other.  
Nonetheless, these approaches utilize an economic framework to justify primate 
conservation. The economic approach, similar to the anthropogenic agenda, weighs the 
costs and benefits of assisting each population. The currency in this framework, 
however, is not species reproductive potential, but rather livelihood and literal currency. 
To motivate local communities, external agencies often speak of the benefits 
outweighing the costs to maintain conservation initiatives. For example, an agency may 
provide the community with new tree nurseries and educational facilities in exchange for 
the protection of local forests. In theory, the livelihood generated through these new 
institutions should be greater than that generated by traditional practises, which are 
detrimental to primate communities (practices such as hunting and trapping) (Hill, 2002, 
p. 1189). In these approaches, economic incentives are often negotiated, and 
communities are compliant as long as their gain is measurable and evident. This can 
become problematic, as it risks embedding the value of measurable gains and losses in 
these communities, which may lead to opportunistic conservation.  
In his essay “Bonding, biophilia, biosynergy and the future of primates in the wild,” 
Rose (2011) offers two worldviews through which primate conservation can be 
approached. The first, a synergistic communal worldview, sees the environment in which 
we live as an integrated holistic system. The second perspective, termed competitive 
hierarchical, is a more Western worldview. Competitive hierarchical worldviews see the 
world as a competition that must be won by individuals at any cost to the environment 
they inhabit. Even in domains like conservation, which seem to be selfless and offer little 
gain to individuals, the competitive hierarchical worldview drives actions. Therefore, 
while a conservationist ethic can be reconciled with competitive hierarchical worldviews, 
such efforts are inherently selfish. For example, a competitive hierarchist who 
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personal interest in that taxa, etc.) (p. 246). What at first seems selfless is actually yet 
another match in the game that competitive hierarchists are trying to win.  
This competitive rationale explains why corporations or individuals will "embellish 
their image as wildlife protectors to gain advantage over their corporate competitors for 
donor funding" (Rose, 2011 p. 246). Competition, even if it is over conservation, is 
driven by incentive, as with the incentive of grant funding in the above example. 
Essentially, the framework in which competitive hierarchists operate is capitalistic, 
anthropocentric, and individualistic, and the methods employed to achieve a goal will 
reflect these features. Imposing an incentive-centric system on a synergistic communal 
cultural can trigger a worldview shift into a competitive one. Understanding 
conservation efforts and the benefits generated from incentive programs may motivate 
local peoples to comply, but action is ultimately driven by self-interest and not by a 
desire to see the primates protected.  
Theoretically, incentive-based, community-centred programmes should result in 
higher levels of protection to primates. Successful programs focus on alternative 
livelihood strategies, giving locals the tools to subsist without encroaching on primate 
habitats or interfering with primate populations. However, these benefits are dangerous, 
as they are entirely dependent on the favourableness of primate protection in a 
cost/benefit analysis. By adopting a competitive, incentive-based perspective on primate 
conservation, we are inviting the potential consequences of understanding primates as 
economic units.  
For this purpose, economic units can be thought of as any item or substance that 
can be quantified in terms of gains or losses and considered in terms of trading potential. 
In this sense, complying with a primate conservation initiative leads a community to gain 
X advantage (quantifiable benefits). The presence of primates becomes equivalent to 
benefit X and are now measurable units of economic value. The primates have become 
valuable economically and take on the role of an exploitable resource. From this, it is 
easy to conjecture a situation in which any behavioural change on the locals' behalf is 
driven by economic incentive. The primates, as a proxy for economic development, 
become worth the benefit they bring. 
In such a situation, what would occur if a corporation offered the locals a higher 
price for increased crop yields than the ecotourism industry could offer for continued 
tourism? Primates, as crop raiders, often interfere with optimizing crop yields (Hill, 2002 
p. 1186). The primates now have a fixed value assigned to them by the cashflow 
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value of the crops is greater than this value, the locals will have no motivation to comply 
with conservation programmes. Simply put, since the perspectives on primates have not 
changed, the farmers have no ethical or moral obligations towards primates. Their moral 
obligation was to themselves and their economic state, using the primates as tools to 
succeed in these arenas. It follows that farmers will resume hunting and trapping of 
primates, seeking still to “win” economically within their anthropocentric, individualistic 
ethic. Their ethical duty, in this case, is to themselves and not the primates; any 
perceived benefit to the primate populations is coincidental.  
The danger of commodifying primates in this manner does not end at primate 
communities; given that the incentives to locals are imposed by external agencies, human 
populations are under similar risk as primates but on a different scale. Similar to how 
human communities use primates to succeed economically, external agencies often use 
communities the same way to increase funding, satisfy shareholders, and create “waves” 
of change. The external agencies, whether NGOs or travel companies, are governed by 
similar economic ethics that attempt to maximize profits in a justifiable way (Rose, 2011, 
p. 246). Their moral duty may be not to the communities but to their funders and 
shareholders. Thus, if it becomes more economically profitable to pull support, or if the 
desired conservation goals are not being met sufficiently, a community can be 
abandoned to disastrous outcomes. Problems resulting from withdrawn support have 
been documented in many cases, such as in Sri Lanka, where the cessation of subsidized 
pesticide programs (caused by a shift in the economic motivations of an external 
corporation) led to an inability for farmers to maintain yields at a market level (Fennel, 
2010 p. 143). The dramatic financial and livelihood impact this had on these farmers was 
a consequence of the farmers no longer fitting into the prioritized economic model 
upheld by the external agencies that had previously funded them.  
Approaching conservation with such competitive hierarchal worldviews 
(anthropocentric, economic ethic) clearly creates ethical and logistical dilemmas. These 
problems originate from the fact that such ethics take a single unit's perspective and rank 
other units accordingly; they are ranked systems of priority determined by cost/benefit 
analyses. Such a ranking system justifies the community abandoning primates at times, 
just as it justifies corporations abandoning communities. Thus, while approaching 
conservation at a community level does connect the two groups, it does so through the 
perspective of only one. Take, for example, the case of orangutans and nearby farmers. 
To survive, an orangutan needs sufficient food resources. Faced with increasingly 
fragmented habitats, orangutans try to meet their nutritional requirements by raiding 
palm fields. Farmers, at the same time, need to protect their crops from orangutans to 
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needs, but because the ethic acknowledges the contrasting goals, this ethic still calls for 
prioritization and ranking.  
One solution to prioritization is developing a more profound ecological 
understanding of both groups, as represented in eco-centric or reciprocal relationships 
between all beings (Baird-Callicot, 2001 p. 79). To refer again to Rose's (2011) definition 
of a synergistic communal worldview, such an ethic holds that each being has a specific 
place in an ecological landscape. Removing any being from its place creates the risk of 
the entire structure collapsing (2011, p. 246). Thus, value and importance are acephalous 
and cannot be ranked. Neither primates and humans exist to serve the other. Both exist 
in a continuous state of interaction with other ecological forces in which the only unit of 
consideration is integrity of the entire system (Baird-Callicot, 2001, p. 79). All beings 
comprise an integrated whole, and there are no priorities to consider. By this ecological 
ethic, both the farmer and orangutan still have needs, but there is an understanding that 
the two are dependent on each other for some needs and tied up in a complex series of 
ecological relationships for others. Removing or lessening the impact of either will not 
solve a problem, as it disturbs the integrity of the entire system. This can be seen with 
great clarity in the role primates play as important seed dispersers in many ecosystems. 
Likewise, humans thinning forests and hunting primates can sometimes (when done 
sustainably) benefit primate populations by opening resources and lessening competition 
(Hill, 2002, pp. 1185-1190). One population's priorities cannot be extracted from this 
equation, as both populations are intrinsically connected and integrated.  
Calling for fundamental change in the way that we conceptualize conservation is not 
something that is feasible over a short timescale. As of now, research is being conducted 
to better understand the ethics that communities already hold towards neighbouring 
primates (Treves et al, 2006, p. 386). While a body of literature builds, current ethics can 
continue to proceed in the short term. The same goals are attained when hunting and 
trapping activities are controlled and forest habitats conserved. The change that needs to 
be made, however, is rather a theoretical one that will strengthen the practical solutions 
being employed. The understanding of both humans and primates as integral parts of a 
whole will solidify existing practical solutions and strengthen both the community's 
motivations to maintain programmes and corporations' motivations to fund them.  
Calling for an enduring change in the understanding of primate conservation will 
lead to more sustainable efforts that are less vulnerable to being abandoned by external 
agencies and conditions. This will foster a more positive interconnected relationship 
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